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DELAY DISCOUNTING
The majority of intertemporal choice studies have been designed 
to explore delay discounting, the robust ﬁ  nding that animals, 
including humans, behave as though immediately consumable 
goods are more valuable than those only available after some delay. 
This phenomenon is so powerful that decision-makers frequently 
forgo delayed rewards in favor of immediate rewards even when 
the delayed rewards are objectively more valuable. For example, 
a   decision-maker might choose $100 delivered immediately over 
$200 to be delivered in 3 years. Such a choice is said reﬂ  ect the sub-
jective value of the $200 option, discounted according to the associ-
ated 3-year delay. The sway of negative events is similarly blunted 
by delay. The idea of working on your taxes next month seems less 
unpleasant than the prospect of working on them tonight.
Economics has viewed delay discounting from within the frame-
work of discounted utility theory (Samuelson, 1937) according 
to which the subjective value of goods drops by a ﬁ  xed percent-
age (frequently referred to as the discount rate) for each unit of 
time that those goods are delayed. If a decision-maker discounts 
the future at a rate of 10% annually, then $100 available in a year 
is only worth $90 right now. That same reward offered in 5 years is 
only worth $59. If this drop in subjective value is plotted over time, 
the resulting discounting curve is exponential in shape.
Behavioral work on delay discounting has primarily focused 
on two major facets of the phenomenon. First, it appears that 
animals, including humans, do not discount exponentially. Given 
that such behavior is arguably non-normative, this possibility has 
generated a large body of behavioral data (Ainslie and Herrnstein, 
1981; Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989; Ainslie, 1992; Green et al., 
1994a; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995; Rachlin, 1995; Kirby, 1997) 
nearly all of which demonstrates that decision-makers behave as 
though their discount rate declines as rewards are pushed further 
into the future. Waiting 2 years for a reward might be worth 10% 
less than waiting 1 year, but waiting 4 years for a reward might 
be worth only 5% less than waiting 3 years. Such discounting is 
INTRODUCTION
Decision-makers are frequently faced with choices that differ in 
the timing of their consequences. Such intertemporal choices 
require shrewd decision-makers to consider, not only what they 
want, but when they want it. For example, when asked to deliver 
a guest lecture, your response is likely to depend strongly on 
whether the lecture is to be delivered relatively soon or in the 
more   distant future. More gravely, decisions about whether to 
reﬁ  nance one’s mortgage (Harding, 2000) and about whether 
governments should spend money to protect the environment 
(Dasgupta, 2008; Hardisty and Weber, 2009) can be characterized 
as intertemporal choices. Furthermore, abnormalities in inter-
temporal choice behavior have been associated with an array of 
undesirable behavior including drug addiction (Kirby and Petry, 
2004; Rossow, 2008). Given the relevance of intertemporal choice, 
it is clear that we have much to gain by understanding how inter-
temporal choices are made, what factors inﬂ  uence intertemporal 
choices, and what is responsible for aberrations in intertemporal 
choice in some patient populations.
Like much of decision-making, intertemporal choice has long 
been the province of economics. Work from this ﬁ  eld has  provided 
both normative guidelines for intertemporal choice and the 
 theoretical tools to evaluate observed behavior. Empirical  support 
has come primarily from psychology and has, as it often does, 
focused on decision-makers’ deviations from the prescriptions of 
economics. With the recent interest in utilizing neurobiological 
techniques to understand decision making behavior (Glimcher, 
2003; Glimcher et  al., 2008), particularly functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), we are in the position to observe the 
operation of the processes responsible for intertemporal decisions, 
processes that are extremely difﬁ  cult to evaluate using behavior 
alone. Here, we review recent work on intertemporal choice 
with a focus on studies involving humans, the majority of which 
have   utilized a combination of behavior, fMRI, and quantitative 
 economic  theory.
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referred to as hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic and is blamed for a 
variety of unwanted behavior (Ainslie, 2001) all stemming from 
the fact that hyperbolic discounters make one set of choices about 
rewards in the distant future only to reverse their preferences as 
those same rewards draw near.
Second, work has focused on the rate of discounting itself and 
has found that discounting rates vary across individuals and con-
texts, and are sometimes unreasonably extreme. For example, in 
two of the more well-cited studies (Hausman, 1979; Gately, 1980), 
discount rates were estimated based on the purchase price and 
operating costs of home appliances. The estimated rates were shown 
to be signiﬁ  cantly greater than typically assumed by economists 
(anywhere from 25 to 300% per year which is obviously well above 
the rates at which consumers borrow and invest). Thus, there has 
been a signiﬁ  cant effort to characterize the rate at which various 
populations discount rewards. For example, children (Green et al., 
1994b; Scheres et al., 2006), including those with attention deﬁ  cit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD, Barkley et al., 2001), alcoholics 
(Vuchinich and Simpson, 1998; Petry, 2001), smokers (Bickel et al., 
1999; Reynolds et al., 2004), cocaine and heroin addicts (Coffey 
et al., 2003; Kirby and Petry, 2004), and compulsive gamblers (Holt 
et al., 2003) all discount at a faster rate than healthy adults; they 
exhibit a relative inability to wait for rewards. In contrast, older 
adults (Green et al., 1994b) and those with a higher IQ (Shamosh 
and Gray, 2008) have been shown to discount at a slower rate; they 
exhibit relative patience.
Utilizing classic intertemporal choice tasks, recent work in cog-
nitive neuroscience has begun to address the neural mechanisms 
associated with delay discounting. One basic question that this ﬁ  eld 
is uniquely suited to address is what distinguishes those occasions 
on which decision-makers choose to wait from those occasions on 
which they choose immediate rewards. That is, what leads to patient 
and impatient choices? Wittmann et al. (2007) utilized fMRI and a 
standard intertemporal choice task (though with completely hypo-
thetical rewards). Based on subjects’ choices, the magnitude of the 
immediate option was adjusted incrementally to ﬁ  nd the point at 
which that particular decision-maker would be indifferent between 
the immediate and delayed options. Trials on which the delayed 
option was chosen (patient choices) were then compared to trials on 
which the immediate option was chosen (impatient choices). This 
contrast yielded a network of brain regions that included bilateral 
posterior insular cortex, left posterior cingulate, as well as temporal 
and parietal regions. Interestingly, no regions appeared to exhibit 
greater activity when choosing the immediate reward. This study 
also observed higher levels of activity in the striatum when sub-
jects were asked about rewards to be delivered in the near future 
(<1 year) than when they were asked about delayed rewards in the 
distant future (≥1 year).
These ﬁ   ndings, particularly the involvement of the insula, 
extends previous work (Tanaka et al., 2004) on reward-based learn-
ing that has shown a delay-related gradient running from anterior 
to posterior insular cortex. When subjects learn to make sequences 
of actions to acquire monetary rewards, anterior and inferior 
portions of insular cortex appear to be differentially involved in 
producing reward-prediction error signals related to immediate 
rewards. In contrast, posterior and superior portions of insular 
cortex appear to serve this same function when learning about 
more delayed rewards. Taken together, these studies suggest that 
decisions involving increased delay are associated with activity in 
the posterior insula.
Though insular cortex has been implicated in a variety of sen-
sory, cognitive, and emotional processes, there are intriguing inter-
sections between these decision-related ﬁ  ndings and previous work 
on pain. Mirroring the delay-related gradient in insular cortex, 
work on pain perception has found a similar differentiation along 
the anterior–posterior axis with more posterior portions associated 
with the more sensory aspects of pain processing and the more 
anterior portions associated with the more cognitive or emotional 
aspects of pain (Singer et al., 2004). For example, the anticipation 
of impending pain elicits activity in more anterior portions of the 
insula than the subsequent pain experience itself (Ploghaus et al., 
1999). More generally, insular cortex has been associated with drug 
addiction, a condition marked by, and presumably maintained by, 
pronounced difﬁ  culties in weighing short-term gains (e.g., drug-
use) against long-term outcomes (e.g., jail, health). For example, 
cocaine addicts exhibit structural abnormalities in insular cortex 
including white matter legions (Bartzokis et al., 1999) and a reduc-
tion in gray matter (Franklin et al., 2002). In particular, insular 
activity appears to be closely related to drug craving (Garavan et al., 
2000; Kilts et al., 2001; Schneider et al., 2001; Bonson et al., 2002; 
Brody et al., 2002; Myrick et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2007) and relapse 
(Paulus et al., 2005; Naqvi et al., 2007). Abnormal insular activation 
has also been found in individuals with ADHD (Ernst et al., 2003; 
Rubia et al., 2009, but see Scheres et al., 2006) and conduct disorder 
(Rubia et al., 2009) who, like addicts, exhibit diminished patience 
in delay discounting tasks (Barkley et al., 2001).
Other work has sought to explore what neural features distin-
guish patient individuals from impatient individuals. Activity in the 
striatum has been shown (Hariri et al., 2006) to predict discount-
ing rates across individuals such that larger but less discriminative 
reward prediction errors are associated with diminished patience. 
This same pattern of striatal activity was recently shown (Forbes 
et al., 2009) to be associated with genetic variation in genotypes 
thought to inﬂ  uence the release, availability, and signaling strength 
of dopamine (DAT1, DRD2, and DRD4). There also appears 
(Boettiger et al., 2007) to be a relationship between polymorphic 
variation of the catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) gene and 
delay discounting with the 158Val/Val genotype being associated with 
diminished patience and hyperactivity in dorso-lateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) and posterior parietal cortex (with no apparent 
effects in the striatum). The 158Val/Val genotype has also been linked 
to perseverative errors during reinforcement learning tasks which 
have been attributed to reduced levels of dopamine in prefrontal 
cortex (Egan et al., 2001; Frank et al., 2007). Lastly, there is intrigu-
ing evidence (Yacubian et al., 2007) that variation of COMT and 
DAT may interact to modulate complex patterns of activity in the 
striatum during reward processing.
More recent neurocognitive work has explored delay discount-
ing using more ﬁ  ne-grained analytical methods. For example, an 
fMRI study by Kable and Glimcher (2007) utilized what they refer 
to as a “neurometric” approach in order to explore brain regions 
whose activity varied with the subjective value of various monetary 
rewards. In their study, decision-makers completed a standard inter-
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that varied both in their magnitude and in when they would be 
delivered. For example, a subject might choose between $20 to be 
delivered that day and $40 to be delivered 30 days later. By observing 
how changes in delay and reward magnitude modulated behavioral 
choices, the discounting curves underlying subjects’ choices could 
be reconstructed (Myerson and Green, 1995). These reconstructed 
curves could then be used to compute the idiosyncratic subjective 
value of any arbitrary reward–delay combination. To explore the 
neural representation of subjective value, these authors investigated 
what, if any, brain regions exhibited activity that corresponded 
to these subjective value functions. The results indicated that the 
ventral striatum, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior cingulate 
cortex exhibited such a pattern of activity. Variation in these regions’ 
activity was better predicted by subjective value than by several 
related quantities (e.g., delay, reward magnitude, choice) and closely 
mirrored individual differences in subjects’ discounting rates.
One problem in relating the neurobiological work on human 
intertemporal choice with the currently larger literature on non-
human animals (Cardinal, 2006) is that the delays typically utilized 
in human tasks (e.g., days, months, years) are signiﬁ  cantly longer 
than those used with other animals (e.g., less than a minute). In 
an attempt to bridge this gap, recent work (Gregorios-Pippas et al., 
2009) has investigated human delay discounting utilizing relatively 
short delays. Subjects completed a delay discounting task involving 
delays ranging from 4 to 14 s. Unlike other studies, subjects did 
not choose between rewards. Instead, subjects were presented with 
visual cues about impending, temporally delayed rewards with the 
identity of the cue reliably signaling the length of the delay (although 
rewards were only paid out at the conclusion of the study). The 
results reveal that the visual cues elicited graded increases in the 
ventral striatum (the focus of this study) such that cues associ-
ated with shorter delays (thus indicating more subjectively valu-
able rewards) elicited greater striatal activity. Furthermore, these 
neural responses mirrored individual subjects’ patterns of choice 
in a separate behavioral choice task. Intriguingly, these cue-induced 
neural responses tended to decrease as subjects’ total accumulated 
reward increased, suggesting a potential neural analog of diminish-
ing marginal utility (Edwards, 1954). Taken together with the work 
of Kable and Glimcher (2007), these results suggest that activity in 
the ventral striatum, along with portions of anterior and posterior 
medial cortex, exhibits a graded signal that represents the subjective 
value of delayed rewards. This, along with related pharmacological 
work demonstrating the role of dopamine in delay discounting 
(Montague and Berns, 2002; Kheramin et al., 2004; Winstanley 
et al., 2004; Phillips et al., 2007; Moustafa et al., 2008) suggests that 
striatal–cortical circuitry is likely to be a key player in the valuation 
of delayed rewards and a target for therapeutic work on disorders 
characterized by impulsive behavior (Rahman et al., 2001).
MECHANISMS UNDERLYING DELAY DISCOUNTING
Despite the large and growing literature describing the neural sig-
nals that represent the idiosyncratic, subjective value of delayed 
rewards, we ultimately wish to understand the origin of these value 
signals, their variation across healthy individuals, and their aber-
rations in clinical populations. If the subjective value of delayed 
rewards underlies impatient choices occur when, it seems reason-
able to ask why they are not valued more strongly. With a better 
understanding of how subjective value is computed, we would be 
in a much better position to design both diagnostic instruments 
and treatments.
Theorizing in psychology has emphasized the idea that choices 
between delayed rewards (as well as other types of choices) involve 
a competition between “the passions” and reason (Ainslie, 1975, 
2001; Schelling, 1984; Loewenstein, 1996; Soman et al., 2005). Some 
(Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999) suggested that this   competition is 
between rational, cognitive processes and irrational, emotional 
processes. Others (Thaler and Sheffrin, 1981; Ainslie, 1992; McClure 
et al., 2004) have suggested a competition between a prudent, far-
sighted process concerned with overall welfare and a greedy, myopic 
process more concerned with immediate gains. Regardless of the 
details, what is common across these accounts is the belief that the 
relative value of waiting and immediate gratiﬁ  cation results from 
a struggle between mutually incompatible drives. If the prudent, 
rational, cognitive system is able to suppress the greedy, myopic, 
emotional system, then the decision-maker will see the wisdom 
of waiting and exhibit relative patience. Otherwise, the emotional 
system will dominate, producing a strong aversion to waiting and 
relative impatience.
Several broad literatures have yielded data in support of this 
general proposal, though it is predominantly indirect in nature. 
For example, there appear to be large inter-species differences in 
delay discounting, though the comparison is plagued by methodo-
logical differences which make interpretation difﬁ  cult. Compared 
to humans, non-human animals exhibit greater impatience for 
delayed rewards (Logue et al., 1986). Even monkeys, which exhibit 
relative cognitive sophistication, will choose immediate rewards 
over signiﬁ  cantly large delayed rewards even when the delay is only 
several seconds (Kim et al., 2008; Hwang et al., 2009). For pigeons, 
the situation is even more dramatic, with immediate rewards losing 
approximately 50% of their value when delayed by a single second 
(Mazur, 1984). To the extent that one associates prudent, rational 
control of behavior with frontal lobe function (and to the extent 
that species differences are not a methodological artifact), these dif-
ferences across species suggestively mirror the  phylogenetic devel-
opment of frontal cortex (Fuster, 2002). Similarly, delay discounting 
behavior appears to follow a systematic trajectory over the course 
of the human lifespan (Green et al., 1994b, 1999b). Relative to 
young adults, children exhibit signiﬁ  cantly less patience for delayed 
rewards. Here again, this developmental trend is generally consist-
ent with the ontogenetic changes taking place in frontal cortex 
(Sowell et al., 1999; Fuster, 2002). A related and growing literature 
has also demonstrated a strong relationship between overall intel-
lectual ability and patience (Mischel et al., 1989; Burks et al., 2009). 
Indeed, a recent meta-analysis of 24 relevant delay discounting 
studies ultimately concluded that higher IQ is reliably associated 
with greater patience (Shamosh and Gray, 2008).
Two related studies by McClure and colleagues (McClure et al., 
2004; McClure et al., 2007) provide the ﬁ  rst neural evidence to 
support the idea that delay discounting involves a dual-process 
competition. Speciﬁ  cally, this group tested Laibson’s beta-delta 
account of discounting (Laibson, 1997) which posits two com-
ponents: one concerned with immediate rewards (beta) and one 
concerned with delayed rewards (delta). Using a traditional delay 
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pairs of rewards of varying sizes to be delivered at various points 
in the future. To isolate neural activity associated with the beta 
component, trials involving an immediate reward were compared 
with trials that involved only delayed rewards. This comparison 
revealed several brain regions that exhibited greater activity when 
faced with an immediate reward. These regions included ventral 
striatum, medial prefrontal cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex. 
To isolate the delta component, brain regions that were activated by 
the task, but that did not distinguish between the different delays 
were selected. This resulted in a broad network of regions including 
dorsolateral and ventrolateral portions of prefrontal cortex as well 
as lateral orbital frontal cortex.
In isolation, these contrasts are relatively coarse, especially given 
how well-speciﬁ  ed the theory being tested is. Critically, however, 
further analyses demonstrated that the relative activity in these two 
networks was predictive of subjects’ choices. When faced with a 
choice between an immediate reward and a delayed reward, choos-
ing the immediate reward was associated with increased activity 
in the beta network and decreased activity in the delta network. 
Choices for the delayed reward were associated with the opposite 
pattern. A recent replication of this study generalized these ﬁ  nd-
ings to decisions involving primary rewards (juice and water) and 
shorter delays (up to 20 min). Contrasts revealed similar networks 
of brain regions associated with the beta and delta components. 
Furthermore, choices were again found to be predicted by the rela-
tive activity in the two networks, this time utilizing more rigorous 
regression analyses.
It is interesting to note that the anatomical details of the beta 
and delta networks grossly mirror the psychologist’s conceptu-
alization. The greedy, irrational, myopic drive is embodied by 
portions of the evolutionarily older limbic system whereas the 
rational, patient drive is embodied by the relatively recent frontal 
cortex (particularly DLPFC). The relationship between activity 
in these networks and choice behavior also matches the expected 
competition. To the extent that DLPFC can suppress the  relatively 
insolent limbic system, the decision-maker will make choices that 
are beneﬁ  cial in the long-run. If the passionate limbic system 
can overcome the DLPFC’s control, the decision-maker makes 
 impatient  choices.
Along with a fairly well-entrenched theoretical story, investi-
gations into the mechanisms underlying delay discounting face 
another hurdle; such investigations are simply difﬁ  cult to con-
duct. The above investigation of the beta and delta networks is 
illustrative. Though these ﬁ  ndings are consistent with the theo-
retical framework proposed by its authors, this interpretation has 
been criticized (Kable and Glimcher, 2007) as being consistent 
with alternative formulations. Recall the investigations into the 
neural representation of subjective value reviewed above. These 
studies found that activity in a highly similar set of regions was 
related to both delay and reward magnitude (and their combina-
tion, subjective value). Thus, it is possible that the ostensible beta 
network exhibited greater activity for immediate rewards simply 
because the   immediate reward represented an option with a large 
subjective value. Furthermore, if choices are made on the basis 
of subjective value, then it is not surprising that activity in the 
beta should be related to choice behavior (see regression analyses, 
McClure et al., 2007). Below we outline other obstacles.
DELAY AND IMPLIED RISK
The work reviewed above illustrates that neuroscientists have done 
much to shed light on what distinguishes patient from impatient 
choices and individuals and have even begun to gain insight to the 
cognitive and neural processes that govern decisions about delayed 
rewards. However, there is an even more basic issue that has been 
largely ignored. Why are delayed rewards discounted at all? Why are 
small, immediate rewards ever tempting enough to eclipse larger, 
delayed rewards? Why would rational decision-makers not always 
wait for larger rewards, regardless of the associated delay?
Again, one likely explanation may come from a long history of 
theorizing in economics (Yaari, 1965; Benzion et al., 1989; Prelec 
and Loewenstein, 1991; Sozou, 1998; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005), 
ecology (Kacelnik, 2003), and psychology (Mischel, 1966; Stevenson, 
1986; Mazur, 1989; Rachlin et al., 1991; Mazur, 1995, 1997) which 
suggests that delay exerts its inﬂ  uence on choices via the perceived 
risk associated with waiting; a suggestion that has been referred to 
as the implicit risk hypothesis (Benzion et al., 1989). If a decision-
maker believes that the probability of acquiring a promised reward 
is uncertain simply by virtue of being delayed, then that decision-
maker is justiﬁ  ed in reducing the subjective value of the reward. 
For example, a bird waiting for fruit to ripen might choose to eat 
some immediately if it believed the fruit’s future availability was not 
guaranteed (i.e., it could be eaten by a competitor, it might rot, etc.). 
Furthermore, decision-makers might believe that the probability of 
receiving a promised reward generally decreases with time which 
would give rise to the monotonic decreases in subjective value that 
occur with increases in delay.
In one sense, the implicit risk hypothesis is attractive because 
it has the potential to entirely eliminate the phenomenon of delay 
discounting by translating time, the processing of which we are 
just beginning to grapple with (Mauk and Buonomano, 2004), 
into probability and uncertainty, concepts that are relatively well 
understood. In another sense, however, this hypothesis creates 
ambiguity when attempting to interpret previous delay discount-
ing results (both behavioral and neural). For example, according 
to the implicit risk hypothesis, comparisons between immediate 
and delayed rewards are actually comparisons between high and 
low probability rewards. Thus, any results from such comparisons 
(e.g., contrasts in fMRI analyses) could reﬂ  ect temporal processing 
or the processing of implicit probability or both. Similarly, one can 
reconceptualize the computation of subjective value as reﬂ  ecting 
implicit probability instead of delay and the same can be done for 
dual-process accounts of choice.
Because of this potential ambiguity, it is instructive to brieﬂ  y 
compare the temporal decision-making results reviewed above 
with work on choice under risk and uncertainty. Just as with the 
delay discounting work reviewed above, insular cortex has been 
implicated in risky decision-making. For example, insular cortex 
exhibits greater activity when decisions-makers chose a low prob-
ability reward than when decisions-makers chose a high probability 
reward (Paulus et al., 2003). Furthermore, insular activity predicts 
the likelihood of choosing low probability rewards. Reward prob-
ability also modulates activity in orbitofrontal and ventromedial 
frontal cortices (Critchley et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2002; Clark et al., 
2008; Xue et al., 2009) as well as in the striatium (Hsu et al., 2005; 
Xue et al., 2009) and activity in the striatum is correlated with the Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 39  |  5
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subjective value of risky rewards (Hsu et al., 2005; Knutson et al., 
2005; Yacubian et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007; Yacubian et al., 2007). 
The overlap between these ﬁ  ndings and those from investigations 
of ostensibly temporal decision-making suggest that there is at least 
a reasonable possibility that the implicit risk hypothesis is correct. 
To be clear, reducing temporal decision-making to risky choice in 
no way trivializes the work on temporal decision-making. Indeed, 
substantiating the neural equivalence of delay and reward probabil-
ity would be a major step forward, helping to unify two, currently 
separate, processes and to validate long-standing theory.
Unfortunately, not all of the empirical evidence for the implicit 
risk hypothesis is as straightforward. For example, manipulations 
of probability and delay appear to elicit different patterns of choices 
(Ostaszewski et al., 1998; Holt et al., 2003; Green and Myerson, 2004; 
Chapman and Weber, 2006). For example, as reward magnitudes 
increase, probability appears to have more inﬂ  uence on behavior, 
whereas delay appears to have less inﬂ  uence (Green et al., 1999a). 
Temporal decisions appear to depend on whether the relevant rewards 
are immediately consumable (e.g., candy) or not (e.g., money) 
whereas discounting over probability does not (Estle et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, some authors (Green et al., 1999a) have noted that 
the lay concept of “impulsivity” seems to best describe an increased 
preference for low probability rewards (e.g., the temptation to play 
the lottery) but a decreased preference for delayed rewards (e.g., the 
temptation to take out a payday loan). Indeed, even with large sam-
ples, choice behavior in delay and probability discounting tasks is 
only weakly correlated within individual subjects (Myerson et al., 
2003). Lastly, there are results showing that delay can have behavioral 
consequences even when probability is held constant. Work on what 
is referred to as the temporal resolution of uncertainty (Chew and 
Ho, 1994; Arai, 1997) has found people exhibit strong preferences 
between gambles in which reward delivery time is ﬁ  xed and only 
differ in when the outcome of the gamble is revealed.
The partial dissociation of risky and temporal decision- making 
implies that the neural basis of temporal decision-making is signiﬁ  -
cantly less clear than it might appear. Without appropriate com-
parisons, it remains ambiguous as to whether delay discounting 
results are being driven by delay, the risk implied by delay, or both. 
Recent work has begun to tackle this issue directly.
DREAD, HOPE, AND THE TEMPORAL RESOLUTION OF 
UNCERTAINTY
The ﬁ  rst direct test of the implicit risk hypothesis to utilize fMRI (or 
any other physiological measure) was recently carried out (Weber 
and Huettel, 2008). Subjects in this study were asked to make two 
sorts of choices. First, subjects performed a classic risky choice 
task, choosing between rewards that varied in both magnitude and 
probability (e.g., a 50% chance of $13.50 or a 100% chance of $7). 
Second, subjects performed a traditional delay discounting task, 
choosing between rewards that varied in both magnitude and delay 
(e.g., $6.25 today or $9.25 in 1 month). According to the implicit 
risk hypothesis, these two conditions should be essentially identi-
cal because the stated delays are only inﬂ  uencing choices via the 
risk they imply. In contrast, this study revealed a variety of brain 
regions that were differentially engaged by the two tasks. Risky choice 
elicited greater involvement of posterior portions of parietal cor-
tex, anterior cingulate, and anterior portions of the insula whereas 
the delay   discounting task elicited greater involvement of DLPFC, 
 posterior cingulate, and the caudate. Unfortunately, this comparison 
was complicated by the fact that subjects exhibited strikingly differ-
ent patterns of choice in the risky and delayed choice tasks. Thus, it 
remains somewhat unclear whether the neural dissociation of risk 
and delay was driven by the task dimensions or other factors.
A recent fMRI study from our lab (Luhmann et al., 2008) has 
taken a slightly different approach to this same question. Rather 
than comparing risky and delay tasks, we instead choose to com-
pare a risky task with a temporal resolution of uncertainty task 
that involved both risk and delay. Doing so allowed us to exert 
considerable control over the decision variables and to thus isolate 
behavioral and physiological results speciﬁ  cally tied to the temporal 
dimension. Subjects choose between pairs small rewards (10 and 20 
cents) that were delivered with varying probabilities (39–100%). In 
the immediate condition, the uncertainty associated with subjects’ 
choices was resolved immediately; subjects’ learned whether they 
would or would not be receiving their chosen reward as soon as 
they made their choice. In the delay condition, the uncertainty 
associated with subjects’ choices was resolved only after some 
variable delay. The delays were constructed such that lower prob-
ability rewards were resolved after a longer delay and higher prob-
ability rewards were resolved after a shorter delay. Speciﬁ  cally, the 
probabilities were such that the delay period embodied a constant 
hazard rate, a pattern that has been theorized to underlie norma-
tive delay discounting (Sozou, 1998; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2005). 
Comparing the two conditions, we found that both risk and delay 
exerted   inﬂ  uence on subjects’ choices. Subjects were signiﬁcantly 
more likely to choose the larger, less probable reward when the 
outcomes were revealed immediately, despite the fact that the 
probabilities were identical. Neurally, the delay condition elicited 
greater activity in the posterior cingulate than did the immedi-
ate condition. Furthermore, we observed parametric effects in the 
parahippocampal gyri, the anterior cingulate and the portions of 
superior parietal cortex such that activity in these regions increased 
as the delay associated with chosen rewards increased. Lastly, we 
found that differences in individuals’ attitudes toward the delay 
component of our task were mirrored by activity in a region of 
frontopolar cortex.
These two studies appear to contradict the implicit risk hypoth-
esis and may begin to shed some light on how delay and risk exert 
dissociable inﬂ  uences on choice. We have noted that the speciﬁ  c 
brain regions implicated in temporal processing in our study have 
also been implicated in the process of prospection, the imagining 
of events in one’s future (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007; 
Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 
2007; Addis and Schacter, 2008). Thus, we suggested that one way 
in which temporal decisions might differ from similar, risky deci-
sions, is that deliberation about temporal choices is likely to involve 
evaluating both the reward and its value, but also the experience 
of waiting itself. Our subjects’ choice behavior implied that delay-
ing the resolution of uncertainty decreased the subjective value of 
options (much like when reward delivery is delayed). This very well 
may be due to the fact that the delay interval itself evoked a nega-
tive subjective experience. Decision-makers able to foresee such 
experiences as they deliberated their choices would be in a much 
better position to make superior choices.Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  October 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 39  |  6
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This possibility highlights the true complexity of temporal 
  decision-making. Risky choice involves presenting a choice to the 
decision-maker, allowing a choice to be made, and resolving the 
outcome, all of which can and usually does happen rather quickly. 
Temporal decisions, on the other hand, are made at one point in 
time, but produce consequences that are subsequently stretched 
out over time. Decision-makers have subjective experiences as 
they attempt to make decision, while waiting, when uncertainty is 
resolved, and when receiving (or not receiving) the reward itself. To 
the extent that any or all of these experiences can be forecast before 
choices are made (Wilson and Gilbert, 2005), they can presumably 
exert some inﬂ  uence on decision-makers’ behavior (Loewenstein, 
1987; Loewenstein et al., 2001).
Indeed, we already know something about the physiology of 
anticipation itself. For example, in a particularly elegant fMRI study 
(Berns et al., 2006), human subjects were shown cues followed by 
a variable delay and then an electric shock. The identity of the cue 
signaled the duration of the delay interval, so subjects knew in 
advance how long they would have to wait. As subjects waited for the 
shock delivery, a network of brain regions exhibited a complex and 
theoretically interesting pattern of activity. Regions that respond 
to pain, including somatosensory cortex, insular cortex, and the 
anterior cingulate, exhibited activity that reﬂ  ected both the antici-
pation of the impending shock as well as dread, the negative, subjec-
tive experience associated with the waiting itself. Furthermore, the 
neural patterns exhibited during this delay period were associated 
with preferences in a behavioral decision-making task performed 
separately. Those subjects that exhibited the strongest neural effects 
of dread were more likely to choose stronger, immediate shocks 
over weaker, but delayed shocks.
We also know that delay period activity is modulated by factors 
such as risk. In one study (Critchley et al., 2001), decision-makers 
made risky choices and had the outcomes of their choices with-
held for 8 s. Across trials, the probability of winning was varied to 
investigate anticipatory processes. Several regions, including the 
anterior cingulate and orbital frontal cortex, and anterior insula 
exhibited delay period activity that reﬂ  ected the amount of uncer-
tainty subjects were facing.
These ﬁ  ndings suggest that temporal decisions pose a formi-
dable challenge for the savvy decision-maker. Despite the rela-
tive simple descriptions temporal outcomes can take (e.g., $100 
in 12 months), they actual embody a complex sequence of events 
 including  emotional and cognitive events, each of which can poten-
tially   inﬂ  uence the subjective value of a choice. Delay periods can 
elicit negative   emotional reactions (e.g., dread) and thus decrease 
the value of delayed outcomes, but waiting can also elicit positive 
emotional reaction (Loewenstein, 1987; Chew and Ho, 1994) and 
thus act to increase value. This lability, coupled with the ﬁ  nding that 
people are not necessarily adept at predicting their future emotional 
reactions (Wilson and Gilbert, 2005), begins to make temporal choice 
look even more difﬁ  cult. Furthermore, not only do these factors 
complicate temporal decision-making itself, they also complicate our 
attempts to study it; attempts to fully control and dissociate each of 
the relevant inﬂ  uences are unlikely to be feasible. Nonetheless, studies 
that acknowledge and take these factors into account certainly have 
the potential to help overcome some of the ambiguities noted above 
and to paint a much richer picture of temporal decision-making.
CONCLUSIONS
The work reviewed above suggests that we are just beginning to 
gain insight into the nature temporal decision-making. Much of 
this work has sought to explore the phenomenon of delay dis-
counting; the ﬁ  nding that waiting for rewards decreases their 
attractiveness. As a ﬁ  rst step, this work has begun to characterize 
the difference between patient and impatient choices within a sin-
gle individual as well as between patient individuals and impatient 
individuals. While critically informative, we ultimately need to 
understand the processes that operate to produce temporal deci-
sions. Fortunately, the study of decision-making has a wealth of 
theoretical tools available from economics. More recent work has 
attempted to leverage economic theories to better understand the 
neural patterns observed during decision-making. The results have 
been provocative, but there are many questions left unanswered.
We have pointed to several places where there is currently ambi-
guity in the treatment of temporal decision-making: correlates of 
patience vs. subjective value signals, delay vs. risk, etc. Furthermore, 
we have tried to point to a small number of relatively unexplored 
dimensions that are likely to be relevant for temporal decision-
  making: affective forecasting, anticipation, etc. This is certainly 
not an exhaustive list, as others (Berns et al., 2007; Wittmann and 
Paulus, 2008) have noted additional relevant factors. At this point, 
it appears that, despite complicating our experimental designs, 
investigating the interactions between these factors would be 
most valuable in illuminating the subtleties of temporal decision-
  making. Given the clinical and public policy implications of tem-
poral   decision-making as well as the sheer scientiﬁ  c potential in 
psychology, neuroscience, and economics, the beneﬁ  ts of such an 
approach seem to outweigh the costs.
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